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This paper develops a specification of the credit scoring model with high discriminatory 
power to analyze data on loans at the retail banking market. Parametric and non- parametric 
approaches are employed to produce three models using logistic regression (parametric) and 
one model using Classification and Regression Trees (CART, nonparametric). The models are 
compared in terms of efficiency and power to discriminate between low and high risk clients 
by employing data from a new European Union economy. We are able to detect the most 
important characteristics of default behavior: the amount of resources the client has, the level 
of education, marital status, the purpose of the loan, and the number of years the client has 
had an account with the bank. Both methods are robust: they found similar variables as 
determinants. We therefore show that parametric as well as non-parametric methods can 
produce successful models. We are able to obtain similar results even when excluding a key 
financial variable (amount of own resources). The policy conclusion is that socio-
demographic variables are important in the process of granting credit and therefore such 
variables should not be excluded from credit scoring model specification. 
JEL Code: B41, C14, D81, G21, P43. 
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applies. 1. Introduction 
Despite the wide variety of banking services, lending to corporate clients and the public 
still constitutes the core of the income of commercial banks and other lending 
institutions. Due to asymmetric information, lending carries a risk in terms of defaulted 
loans. Hasan and Zazzara (2006) stress that under the new Basel II rules that are 
grounded in recognizing an individual credit risk through internal rating systems, banks’ 
managers must correctly measure risk and price it accordingly. Credit scoring greatly 
reduces the risk provided a capable model is applied and reliable data are available as 
firmly shown by Dinh and Kleimeier (2007). 
Following the above arguments we build two parametric and one non-parametric 
credit scoring models and test them on a large dataset of retail loans containing financial 
as well as behavioral and socio-demographic variables from a new EU economy.
1 Based 
on various tests as well as out-of-sample testing we show that our models deliver efficient 
results in terms of potential default identification and that socio-demographic data are 
useful predictors of future characteristics relevant to the loan granting process. This is 
certainly good news as the findings of Jacobson, Lindé and Roszbach (2005) show that 
retail portfolios are usually riskier than corporate credit.
2 In our paper we contribute to 
the literature by providing insights about the main determinants of risk in the retail credit 
market by using two different methodologies. 
 
1.1. Literature 
From a technical perspective, the lending process is a relatively straightforward series of 
actions involving two principal parties. These actions go from the initial loan application 
to the successful repayment of the loan or its default. Although retail lending is among 
the most profitable investments in lenders' asset portfolios (at least in developed 
countries), increases in the amount of loans also bring increases in the number of 
defaulted loans. Thus, the primary problem of any lender is to differentiate between “low 
                                                 
1 We did not incorporate macroeconomic variables into our analysis, as our main area of interest was to 
focus on socio-demographic variables. Also, our data sample reflects only a period of steady macroenomic 
growth in the Czech Republic and to estimate the impact of macroeconomic developments on individual 
defaults would require at least whole economic cycle. 
2 The models developed in this paper may not be transferable to banking markets in the other new EU 
member countries due to the specificity of the data used. Each bank has its own processes and ways to deal 
with clients and defaulted credits and therefore models used in the respective bank may be highly specific. 
  1risk” and “high risk” debtors prior to granting credit. Due to the asymmetric information 
between the lender and borrower such differentiation is not a trivial task. However, it is 
possible by using parametric or non-parametric credit-scoring methods. 
The practice of credit scoring began in the 1960's, when the credit card business 
matured and automatic decision-making processes became necessary. Later, the use of 
credit scoring techniques was extended to other classes of customers, in particular to 
small and medium enterprises. In this respect, Myers and Forgy (1963) compared 
discrimination analysis with regression in credit scoring applications and Beaver (1967) 
introduced a bankruptcy prediction model. The two works above both focused on two 
aspects: predictions of failure as well as on the classification of credit quality. This is an 
important distinction in empirical analysis as it is often not clear which aspect to focus 
on. Altman (1980) described the basic bank lending process as an integrated system and 
analyzed a procedure for how the criteria for the assessment of commercial loans is set.
3 
Most of the credit-scoring literature deals with non-retail loans, i.e. loans to firms, 
as the data are more readily available. Corporate credit scoring—also known as rating 
assignment—is different from scoring for retail loans for several reasons. Primarily, the 
amounts lent are much smaller in the case of retail lending, and therefore from the point 
of view of risk management, retail loans are dealt with using a portfolio approach, while 
corporate loans are managed on an individual basis. Most importantly, there are different 
types of variables used in the process of constructing a model as well as the decision 
process for each type of loan. For example, for corporate loans, various ratios of financial 
indicators are typically used in corporate failure models since they are usually very 
powerful in determining the quality of a client.
4 As regards collateral, for example Blazy 
and Weill (2006) state that it might be that riskier loans are more likely to be 
collateralized, otherwise these projects would not be financed. In retail lending, the bank 
has to collect various socio-demographic characteristics, as well as various behavioral 
indicators (e.g. indicators of a client’s behavior on his current account) to make a 
decision about the client’s portfolio.  
                                                 
3 For a more thorough exposition of the credit scoring literature, see Renault and De Servigny (2004). 
4 Altman and Narayanan (1997)  provide a broad review of corporate failure models and their classification. 
  2As an example of early methodologies concerning retail loans, Long (1976) studied a 
selection of the empirically best credit scoring techniques and proposed criteria for the 
optimal updating cycle of a credit scoring system. Apilado, Warner and Dauten (1974) 
empirically studied two hypotheses: that there is a limited set of variables discriminating 
between low and high risk loans with a high degree of accuracy and that profitability can 
be increased without increasing risk for most lenders. Gropp et al. (1997) examined how 
personal bankruptcy and personal bankruptcy exemptions affect the supply of and 
demand for credit. They found that bankruptcy exemptions redistribute credit towards 
borrowers with a high level of assets. As an example of recent work in the area of retail 
credit scoring, Avery et al. (2004) examine the potential costs of failing to incorporate 
into consumer credit evaluations situational data, such as information about the economic 
or personal circumstances of individuals. They also discuss practical difficulties 
associated with the development of credit scoring models that incorporate situational 
data. For further examples of the uses of credit scoring in retail banking see Jacobson and 
Roszbach (2003); Allen, DeLong, and Saunders (2004); Wagner (2004); Jacobson, Lindé 
and Roszbach (2005); Bofondi and Lotti (2006); Dinh and Kleimeier (2007); and Saurina 
and Trucharte (2007). Finally, Hand and Henley (1997) provide an excellent survey of 
the statistical techniques used in the process of building a credit scoring model. 
 
1.2 Objective 
In this paper we focus on an analysis of the determinants of defaults of retail loans in a 
new EU economy (the Czech Republic). New EU members have recently recorded a 
sharp increase in the amount of this type of loan, and the increase is expected to continue. 
Hilbers et al. (2005) review trends in bank lending to the private sector, with a particular 
focus on Central and Eastern European countries, and find that the rapid growth of 
private sector credit may create a key challenge for most of these countries in the future. 
Take for example two countries on the forefront of the EU integration process: in the last 
few years, banks in the Czech Republic and Slovakia have allocated a significant part of 
their lending to retail clientele. Even before the integration of both countries into the EU, 
the financial liabilities of households between years 1999–2004 (which is covered by our 
data) increased more than twice in both countries (relative to GDP). Later on, in 2006, 
  3Czech and Slovak banks recorded 30.5% and 32% increases in retail loans, respectively. 
In 2007 these increases amounted to 35.2% and 27.8%, respectively. In the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia the financial liabilities of households formed 15.6% and 15.7%, 
respectively, of the GDP in 2006. In 2007 these liabilities increased to 18.8% and 16.4%, 
respectively.
5 The average ratio of financial liabilities to GDP in the older 15 members of 
the European Union is about three times higher than in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia;
6 it is expected that the amount of loans to retail clientele will continue to 
increase, as there is a lot of space for expansion in the financial liabilities of households in both 
countries (even though the household sectors in at least some of the older EU countries clearly 
took on too much debt).  
In light of these recent developments, we address the primary problem of lenders: 
how to determine between low and high risk debtors prior to granting credit. That means 
we aim to build an application type of model that would primarily be suitable for the pre-
scoring of clients.
7 One of our goals is to look at the importance of socio-demographic 
variables as determinants of default. The reason is that this type of variable provides 
useful information in times of change. This is particularly true in new EU members that 
recently underwent an unprecedented economic transformation and have integrated into 
the EU. Socio-demographic variables evolve in a stable manner over time and a well-
designed credit scoring model based on socio-demographic and behavioral variables 
might perform as well as a model based on historic or current financial characteristics. 
In this paper we contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we construct 
two types of credit scoring model, one based on logistic regression and the other on 
Classification and Regression Trees (CART). Both methods are often used for developed 
countries and we are interested in whether they are able to construct a powerful credit 
scoring model for new EU markets that due to their economic history differ from the old 
                                                 
5 These numbers, which originate from the financial stability reports of the central banks of both countries, 
cover only the banking sector and not other types of lending institutions. 
6 As of 2006; source: EU economic data pocketbook. 
7 The models constructed in this paper are not appropriate for example for the ongoing and regular 
calculation of regulatory capital as they rely mostly on the application characteristics of clients valid at the 
time of loan application. Application characteristics are usually not updated during the life of the loan and 
they grow more imprecise as time elapses and therefore are not suitable for the assessment of the current 
riskiness of a portfolio of bank loans. Also, as our main concern is the probability of default models, we do 
not take into account the loss given default parameter of defaulted loans. 
  4EU members. Second, we test our models on an empirical dataset from one of the banks 
operating in the retail loan business in a new EU market (the Czech Republic). Based on 
out-of-sample testing we compare the efficiency of the two methods and identify the key 
determinants of default behavior, with socio-demographic variables being important.
8 We 
show that with the logistic regression model we were able to build a specification that 
does not contain the single most important financial variable (available resources) but 
still performs only marginally worse than the specification with this variable. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data 
used in the estimation process. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and results 
and Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data 
In this section we briefly introduce our dataset. We intentionally deviate from standard 
practice and introduce our data prior to describing the models. This helps us describe our 
models in a more lucid way. Some details about the data are also introduced in the model 
section, where they fit more naturally. 
The dataset used for the estimation in this paper comes from a new EU member 
(the Czech Republic) and was provided by a bank that specializes in providing small- and 
medium-sized loans to retail clientele in the area of real property purchase and 
reconstruction.
9 The same data have been used for the bank’s own assessment and 
scoring modeling. The dataset contains various socio-demographic characteristics and 
other information collected by the bank on 3403 individual clients who were granted 
loans during 1999–2004. The observation period ends in 2006. Out of these, 1695 clients 
defaulted on loans and 1708 performed well, i.e. the sample is artificially balanced to 
have approximately 50% of defaults. The loans are evenly distributed during the analyzed 
                                                 
8 To the best of our knowledge, the empirical studies analyzing this type of problem, with emphasis placed 
on credit scoring related to retail loans, are non-existent in post-transition countries that became EU 
members. Part of the lack is due to the fact that commercial banks in post-transition EU countries, 
especially the biggest ones, are not willing to share their credit-related data. This is understandable since 
having datasets connected with the default behavior of retail clients can be a competitive advantage over 
other banks because these datasets enable the bank to construct better credit models. A bank with an 
accurate and powerful credit scoring model not only decreases its costs connected with bad loans, but also 
strengthens a bank’s risk management in general. 
9 The bank does not wish to be explicitly identified and we honor this request as specified in the contract to 
provide us with the data. 
  5period. There is no concentration of defaults in any period. Each individual client had no 
more than one loan, so there was no need to aggregate several loans for one individual, as 
is often the case for companies. The definition of default follows the Bank for 
International Settlement standard: the client is in default if he or she is more than 90 days 
overdue with any payment connected with the loan. The definition of a good/bad variable 
is derived based on the performance of the client, i.e. the client is considered “bad” in the 
case of his/her default.
10 What follows in the next paragraphs is the economic motivation 
for including the various variables. 
For all clients we have a number of variables that we present in Table 1 along 
with the variable definitions and whether they are categorized or continuous. The first 
part of the characteristics are socio-demographic variables and they characterize the 
client at the moment of loan application. Among others, there are several categorized 
variables related to the client’s employment situation. The bank does not record 
information about the client’s income and expenditures; instead the bank calculates and 
records the relevant credit ratios. The first ratio is the percentage of income that is spent 
on expenditures (Credit Ratio 1). The second ratio is the ratio of a client’s available 
income to the official minimum wage valid at the time of the loan application (Credit 
Ratio 2). The client’s region is designated by the postal code of the region of the client’s 
address. 
The other part of the variables characterizes the relationship between the client and 
the bank. The Loan Protection variable records the credit risk mitigation used, i.e. 
whether collateral, a guarantor or another type of mitigation was used. It is important to 
take into account collateral or guarantee of loan as a riskier but well-collateralized loan 
may be more profitable for a bank than a somewhat less risky loan without collateral. The 
Points variable is the only behavioral characteristic available.
11 It is a variable 
                                                 
10 The bad/good notion is an official definition taken from the Basel II descriptive characteristics of a client 
or her/his loan after the loan has been granted and the bank can see the client’s performance with respect to 
the loan. 
11 Behavioral characteristics are very powerful indicators of the type of client. However, the client needs to 
have a history with the bank in order to use these indicators. Hence, we do not possess other behavioral 
variables such as delinquency. A new client has to be scored almost solely on the basis of her/his socio-
demographic characteristics (as there is still no individual public credit ratings in the Czech Republic that 
banks can use to inform themselves). This is also the reason why we do not take into account the bank’s 
interest rate setting policy. 
  6constructed by the bank and describes the client’s behavior on his or her own current 
account. It quantifies the frequency at which the client deposits money into the account as 
well as whether the deposits follow a regular pattern. Hence, the Points variable depends 
on the amount of a client’s savings as well as on how regular saving deposits are made. 
The Own Resources variable is the amount of resources the client declares to have at the 
time of loan application available to use for the purpose defined in the Purpose of Loan 
variable. For example, it can be the amount of money a client can allocate as a down 
payment for the purchase of an apartment. The Length of Relationship variable is the 
number of years between when the loan was granted and when the client opened an 
account with the bank.
12 We have also tested the sample for the possible multicollinearity 
of the Length of Relationship variable and the Date of Account Opening, but found no 
significant results. 
Finally, our data sample contains information about borrowers who were eventually 
granted loans and does not contain information on rejected applicants, i.e. clients who 
applied for credit but were rejected, as the bank did not collect this data. The true 
creditworthiness status of the rejected applicants is unknown and their characteristics 
might differ from those who were granted a loan. For this reason a potential selection bias 
may occur in our estimations. This is a common problem in the literature and we assume 
that other potential borrowers have similar characteristics as those in the database. In 
addition, Banasik, Crook and Thomas (2003) compared the classification accuracy of a 
model based only on accepted applicants relative to one based on a sample of all 
applicants, and found only a minimal difference. Further, Hand and Henley (1993) 
analyze a “reject inference” process, i.e. a process of attempting to infer the true 
creditworthiness status of rejected applicants. They concluded that a reliable rejection 
inference is impossible and improvements in scoring models achieved by reject inference 
are based on luck, the use of additional information (for example using expert skill) or ad 
hoc adjustments of the rules in a direction likely to lead to a reduced bias. 
 
3. Estimation techniques 
                                                 
12 The Date of Loan variable is an endogenous variable and it is not possible to discriminate on the basis of 
this variable. Therefore this variable is not used in the subsequent analysis. 
  7In this section we introduce two distinct techniques for credit scoring. These are a 
parametric approach with a logistic regression and a non-parametric Classification and 
Regression Trees (CART) model. The methods are described in Sections 3.1. and 3.2, 
respectively. 
As it is not practical to use more than 20 variables in logistic regression or in the 
process of creating trees, single factor analysis was performed as the first step of the 
estimation. With single factor analysis we tried to eliminate variables which have no 
discriminating power. We calculated the so-called “odds ratio” and “information value” 
for each variable. Both characteristics show the degree of the ability of the variable to 
discriminate between defaulted and non-defaulted loans. Variables with the lowest 
information values were then omitted. 
The odds ratio can be used to determine the discrimination ability of the variable 





















where  Defaulted  and  Good are the total numbers of defaulted and non-defaulted 
observations and Defaultedi and Goodi are the numbers of defaulted and non-defaulted 
clients in the ith category of a variable. An odds ratio equal to 1 implies that the variable 
is not able to discriminate between defaulted and non-defaulted clients in the given 
category; other values signal the discrimination ability of the variable. 
The overall information value of a variable is the sum of the information values 
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This information value symbolizes the predictive power of the variable: the higher the 
value, the higher the predictive power of the variable with the given categorization. In 
banking practice a value above 0.2 is taken as a sign of the strong predictability of a 
given variable. 
For our analysis we decided to categorize the continuous variables. Although it is 
possible to build a model using both continuous and discrete variables, the standard 
practice in credit scoring is to use categorized continuous variables. We used the 
  8following practice.
13 First, the range of values for each continuous variable was split into 
ten categories according to the following two principles: 
1. All categories should have the same number of observations, with one exception. 
2. The exception is that observations with the same value for the specific variable 
have to be in the same category. 
The odds ratios and information values were calculated for each category and categories 
with similar values were merged. This step was also performed for the categorized 
variables. The odds ratios and information values for the categories of variables from the 
sample can be found in the Appendix (Table A1). The total information values for the 
variables can be found in Table 2. It can be seen that the most significant variables are 
those that characterize the relationship between the client and the bank, a finding that is 
in accord with the comprehensive overview in Anderson (2007). The variables that 
characterize the loan protection and credit quality of the debtor (i.e. both credit ratios) are 
almost insignificant. This fact is surprising especially in the case of loan protection as one 
would expect that collateral in the form of real estate would be an effective predictor of 
good performance. However, this detail can be explained by the fact that the amount of 
each loan in the data sample is not excessively large and therefore even a defaulted loan 
does not necessarily result in a loss of property. 
It is also interesting that most of the socio-demographic variables are not 
significant. Only Education is a very strong default predictor since clients with a higher 
level of education show much less default than other clients. Marital Status, Region, Sex 
and Employment Position have low information values.
14 Another interesting factor is 
the difference in the information value of both credit ratios. It seems that the default 
behavior of clients does not depend on the absolute amount of “savings” (i.e. the 
difference between income and expenditures) but on relative income (i.e. the ratio of 
expenditures to income). In other words, even high income clients who also have high 
expenditures can be risky clients.  
                                                 
13 There are also other ways to categorize continuous variables, see for example Wermuth and Cox (1998). 
14 The low information value of the Sex variable is in contrast to finding in Dinh and Kleimeier (2007), 
where Sex/Gender was found to have good predicting power, as micro finance literature suggest that 
women repay more reliably. The low information value of the Sex variable also hints at non-discriminatory 
practices, which are otherwise documented for example by Alesina (2009) in Italy. 
  9We will proceed now with the two discrimination techniques to analyze the 
determinants of default behavior. In the course of this analysis we will also compare 
logistic regression with CART (Classification and Regression Trees). 
 
3.1 Logistic regression 
The theoretical background for using logistic, or logit, regression for classification in 
credit scoring has been outlined in the literature, and the literature also shows that logistic 
regression is usually very successful in determining low and high risk loans in tasks 
similar to ours. For details see for example Gardner and Mills (1989), Lawrence and 
Arshadi (1995), Hand and Henley (1997) or Charitou, Neophytou and Charalambous 
(2004). 
  In our analysis we decided to employ all variables with an information value 
higher than 0.1. The reason for such low threshold is to begin with employing more 
variables available for the logistic regression and also to have more socio-demographic 
variables, despite the fact that in our case these tend to exhibit lower information values. 
Although there are missing values in several of the variables, this problem was eliminated 
by categorization, i.e. by creating a category for the missing values. We employed 
forward-backward stepwise model selection using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to 
select the best model. Logistic regression usually starts with the simplest model, i.e. with 
a regression on a constant only. After each step, the chosen model is tested and a decision 
is made on whether any variable can be left out based on the change in the value of the 
information criterion. Then all the models that differ from the current one by adding a 
single variable are tested. This procedure should choose the best model among all the 
models based on the supplied regressors (variables). The coefficients are estimated using 
the maximum likelihood method. Statistical analysis was performed using S-PLUS 6.2 
software. 
  In order to evaluate the performance of our models we follow a strategy to 
partition our dataset into two samples: one for development (development sample) and 
one for validation purposes (validation sample). This way an out-of-sample validation 
can be performed. The dataset was randomly split such that the development sample 
contains two-thirds of the observations (2280 observations) and the validation sample 
  10contains one-third of the observations (1143 observations). The validation sample will be 
later used to test the discriminatory power of the model on a sample that was not used in 
the development stage of the model (out-of-sample testing). The validation sample uses 
different observations as well as different borrowers than those used in the estimation 
sample. 
  The quality of the models is tested using the Receiver Operating Curve (ROC) 
and the GINI coefficient. Webb (2002) defines the ROC as the plot of the true positive 
rate on the vertical axis against the false positive rate on the horizontal axis. All the ROC 
curves pass through the (0,0) and (1,1) points and as the separation increases the curve 
moves into the top left corner. The ideal model should perform 100% detection and have 
a 0% false positive rate. The ROC in the case of the ideal model is characterized by a 
kinked curve passing through the coordinates (0,0)-(0,1)-(1,1). Different models produce 
different ROCs, characterizing the performance of the model. The performance is defined 
as the area under the curve and is usually denoted as the c coefficient. It follows that the 
ideal model has an area under the curve c=1. For the GINI coefficient g, which is the area 
under the Lorenz curve, the relationship g = 2c - 1 is valid. 
  However the choice of the model in practice does not always depend only on the 
ROC curve and the GINI coefficient. It may be important to look at the Type I error 
(accepting a bad loan as a good loan) and Type II error (rejecting a good loan as a bad 
loan). It is a generally-accepted fact the misclassification costs of a Type I error are much 
higher than those of a Type II error. For a Type I error the lender may lose the whole 
amount of loan and its interest while for a Type II error it is only the expected profit from 
the loan. Therefore it may be important to look at the full curve not only at the parameter 
c. In banking practice therefore the choice of model may be based on minimizing 
misclassification costs. 
The logistic regression is based on the following idea. Given a vector of 
application characteristics  x, the probability of default  p is related to vector  x by the 
relationship 
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  11where coefficients wi represent the importance of specific loan application characteristic 
coefficients xi in the logistic regression. Coefficients wi are obtained by using maximum 
likelihood estimation. Logistic regression can handle categorized data by employing a 
dummy variable for each category in the data. 
  Using this method we first estimate Model 1, which is the output of the stepwise 
procedure; i.e. the model was selected as the ideal model using the above-mentioned 
forward and backward stepwise technique. The estimates are presented in Table 3, which 
also contains the list of variables used. The score for each client can be calculated by 
summing the respective coefficient values, where the coefficient has a value of 0 for 
“reference category”. This model has several drawbacks. First, there are variables that 
have insignificant coefficients. Second, due to the high number of categories and 
variables, the model has also high number of degrees of freedom, a property that can lead 
to serious over-learning. 
  In Model 2 we eliminate variables with insignificant coefficients. In particular the 
following variables were dropped: Sector of Employment, Years of Employment, and 
Purpose of Loan. Results are presented in Table 4. The elimination of several variables is 
justified also by the fact that the decrease in AIC was very slow for the last variables that 
entered the model. In Model 2 the value of the AIC increased only by about 2% and also 
the properties of the coefficients are similar to those in Model 1. Thus, Model 2 is able to 
discriminate among clients with fewer variables. 
  Finally, we estimate Model 3. The need for the third and last logistic model is 
driven by the fact that the variable Own Resources is a very strong default predictor. 
Therefore it might be useful to investigate the properties of other variables, i.e. to try to 
construct the model without this variable and to compare what the ability of the model is 
without this strong predictor. Further, the amount of resources a client has is usually very 
hard to detect, especially if a client would have to declare other funds he or she has 
outside the bank. Therefore it might be interesting to see whether it is possible to 
discriminate successfully without the knowledge of what funds the customer has. Model 
3 is constructed using the same list of variables as Model 1 but the variable Own 
Resources is omitted.
15 The coefficients of this model are presented in Table 5 and reveal 
                                                 
15 The stepwise procedure also did not choose the Sector of Employment variable. 
  12that Model 3 is able to successfully discriminate among clients without a knowledge of 
the resources the client owns.
16 
  Next, we compare the quality of the three models using the Receiver Operating 
Curve (ROC) and c coefficients introduced earlier in this section. We plot the ROC 
curves (yielding also the c coefficient) on a single graph (Figure 1) so that a comparison 
of the empirical ROC curves resulting from the three logistic regression models is readily 
available.
17 We can see that Models 1 and 2 are very similar in the shape of the ROC. 
They are also very close in terms of the derived values of the c coefficients: Model 1 has 
c=0.877 and Model 2 has c=0.864, which is a difference of a mere 1.49%. That means 
that both models have very similar characteristics and are able to discriminate with 
almost the same power. Therefore Model 2 is preferred over Model 1 due to the principle 
of parsimony. Model 3 has a much higher value of the AIC, but more importantly the 
value of the c coefficient (c=0.832) is only marginally worse than that of Model 1 or 2. 
The consequences of this are striking: we do not need to know the variable Own 
Resources to construct a model with very similar power to a model containing this 
variable. This offers for example the possibility for a bank to check for fraud simply by 
running two different scoring functions: one which accounts for the declared resources 
the customer owns and one that does not. If there are serious differences in the results it 
may be worth examining the applicant further. 
  Another test of the power of a model is out-of-sample testing, i.e. the testing of 
the discriminatory power of the model on a sample that was not used in the development 
stage of the model, as we note in Section 1.1. In Table 6 we see the values of both c and 
the GINI statistics for all three models. It is possible to see that all models have similar 
power for both development and validation samples. As expected, Model 3 has lower 
power because the most important variable is left out. The approximately 11% loss of 
power does not seem that large in view of its great ability to discriminate in the absence 
of the single most important variable. 
                                                 
16 As a robustness check we also constructed a version of Model 3 using Model 2 with the variable Own 
Resources omitted. The results were equally strong as those presented in Table 5 for Model 3. Because of 
limited space we do not report detailed results, although they are available upon request. 
17 In Figure 1 we also plot the empirical ROC from the Classification and Regression Trees (CART) 
methodology, whose results are presented in Section 3.2. 
  13  We also tested both constrained models (Models 2 and 3) versus Model 1 using 
the log-likelihood ratio test (LR test). The LR test is used in place of a standard F-test. 
The F-test, regularly used in the case of OLS regressions, cannot be employed because 
the response variable is not normally distributed. The LR test is performed by subtracting 
the so-called residual deviances of constrained and unconstrained models.
18 The statistics 
has approximately a Chi-square distribution with n degrees of freedom, where n is the 
number of constraints. The null hypothesis is that the omitted variables are non-
significant, i.e. their coefficients are equal to zero. 
  The residual deviances for all three models are: DEV1=2013.015, 
DEV2=2104.823, and DEV3=2358.410. This means that when comparing Model 1 with 
Model 2 the test statistics is LR12=91.808 with 23 degrees of freedom, and statistics 
comparing Model 1 with Model 3 is LR13=345.395 with 17 degrees of freedom.
19 The 
values are highly statistically significant, implying that we should reject the null 
hypothesis of the non-significance of omitted variables. This is a sign that the omitted 
variables have statistical significance; however the power of all of the models is 
approximately the same. We conclude that all three models can be used for credit scoring. 
However, because of the high number of categories there is the risk connected with the 
possible over-learning of Model 1. Therefore, we lean towards Models 2 and 3. The final 
choice of the model should be based on other criteria dictated by special needs such as 
the results of the out-of-sample back-testing of models, requirements for model 
parsimony and data availability. Further, similarly to the condensed Figure 1 we also plot 
the out-of-sample ROC curves for all three models in Figure 2.
20 A comparison of the 
out-of-sample ROC curves yields a similar outcome as in the case of the empirical ROC 
curves. Model 1 (c=0.869) and Model 2 (c=0.855) perform at a qualitatively similar level 
and Model 3 (c=0.814) lags only marginally behind. 
  Finally, despite the fact that it is common in the literature to use categorized data 
we also estimated specifications in which continuous variables were not categorized. As 
                                                 
18The residual deviances are the analogue of the residual sum of squares in the OLS. 
19 Such a high number of degrees of freedom is implied by the fact that each class of categorized variable 
adds one degree of freedom. Critical values at 1% are 41.638 and 33.409 for 23 and 17 degrees of freedom, 
respectively. 
20 In accord with our previous approach, in Figure 2 we also plot the out-of-sample ROC from the CART 
methodology whose results are presented in Section 3.2. 
  14one of our main goals is to construct a parsimonious model, we also tried a specification 
in which continuous variables are not categorized. In the case of the non-categorized data 
we need to estimate only one parameter for each continuous variable. This specification 
is also important as we are actually estimating a non-linear relationship with respect to 
these variables when we categorize them, because we allow for different sensitivity for 
different levels of the regressors. Therefore we are also interested in the power of the 
specification with variables that are not categorized.
21 The power of the specification 
with non-categorized variables measured by the c coefficient was c=0.834, i.e. at a level 
comparable to that of the original Model 3. Hence, the results are less successful than 
those of the original Models 1 and 2. In the estimation we employed the same forward-
backward stepwise model selection method as in the previous cases. The coefficients in 
the specification with non-categorized variables had similar signs as those for the original 
Model 1 (further confirming the robustness of the specification in our main model) with 
the most significant variable being Own Resources (with a coefficient value of -5.42117 
and the t-value being -12.29606). Other variables chosen were Education, Purpose of 
Loan, Date of Account Opening, Marital Status, Length of Relationship with Bank, 
Sector and Years of Employment. The details associated with the above variables 
including their coefficients and t-values are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
  We now turn to assessing and interpreting our results. With respect to the variable 
Own Resources, in both Model 1 and Model 2 it is possible to observe an inverse 
relationship between the amount of resources a client owns and the probability of default. 
Since we model the probability of default, a higher score reflects a higher default 
probability and, as one would expect, clients with more funds show a lower default 
probability. 
  Another strong predictor is Education Level, which shows that clients with a 
higher level of education have much less difficulty paying their debts. Clients with only 
general secondary education are riskier than those with vocational education at the 
secondary level who have passed the graduation examination.
22 Frequently general 
                                                 
21 We acknowledge the referee for raising this issue. 
22 Vocational education, also called career and technical education, prepares students for specific manual or 
practical careers. Vocational education can be at the secondary or post-secondary level. In some cases 
  15secondary school graduates are not accepted for university education. People without 
specific vocational education and without a university education have a harder time 
getting better-paid job. They are also more likely to fail to find permanent employment 
and to become unemployed, and thus they more often fall into the lowest income 
category. 
  The Length of the Relationship between the client and the bank is the most 
important behavioral characteristic. Evidence from the empirical literature (Hopper and 
Lewis, 1992; Thomas, Ho and Scherer, 2001; Anderson, 2007) shows the positive 
correlation between the length of time the client has had an account with the bank and her 
or his ability to repay the debt. This is because a bank knows clients with longer histories 
better than those with shorter histories, and therefore the bank can better foresee that the 
former group of clients will not default. It has to be noted that the period from the date an 
account is opened is potentially an endogenous variable. The results show that clients 
with accounts opened in the previous few years are not risky at all. However, these 
clients have had less chance to default than clients with longer histories. The variable 
makes sense in the assessment of clients who have been with a bank for a longer time. 
For example, our data show that clients who opened accounts in 1993–1995 are less risky 
than those who opened accounts in 1996–1997. 
Marital status showed to be a relatively strong predictor of default in all the 
models. We conjecture that clients without a spouse may be considered by banks as 
riskier than married clients who take responsibility for a partner and perhaps also a 
family. Further, married clients may be considered as less risky because of the possible 
dual income available.
23 
The variable Amount of Loan offers interesting findings because of the change in 
the coefficient’s sign for different models. Models 1 and 2, which contain the Own 
Resources variable, show that small loans appear to be more risky. Contrary to this, when 
excluding the Own Resources variable as in Model 3, large loans become more risky. The 
explanation may be that both small loans and large loans when the client owns a low 
                                                                                                                                                 
secondary-level vocational education ends with a demanding graduation examination, and having passed 
such an exam indicates a higher level of achievement than graduating without passing an exam.  
23 Two incomes may indicate less risk, regardless of whether they come from a married couple or not. 
Unfortunately, we are unable to explore the latter possibility as our data do not contain information on 
loans with more than one co-signer. 
  16amount of resources are risky. When we account for the client’s own resources, we 
identify a second group of loans (i.e. large loans with the client owning a low amount of 
resources) and the regression is then able to distinguish small (more risky) loans. 
However, if we do not have this information, the regression identifies the larger loans as 
more risky. 
The variable termed Points characterizes a client’s behavior with respect to the 
use of his or her current account. It is the behavioral variable constructed by the bank. It 
quantifies the frequency at which the client deposits money into the account as well as 
whether the deposits follow a regular pattern. Regularity and higher frequency yield a 
higher value for Points. This variable showed as significant only in Model 3. There is a 
relatively high correlation of this variable with the Own Resources variable, which may 
explain its low predictive power in Models 1 and 2. 
The variable Purpose of Loan captures the effect of whether the loan is to be used 
for simple renovation of a standing housing facility or a new construction. The higher the 
coefficient is, the greater the probability of default. Hence, a higher coefficient has 
negative consequences for a client. In our estimation the highest coefficient is recorded 
for the renovation category and the lowest for the house building category. This means 
that loans for renovation are in general more risky then those for house construction. The 
result is in line with observation that the decision to build a house is made mostly by 
people with more potential to repay their loans as compared to those who renovate older 
houses.
24 
It is interesting that both credit ratios proved to be non-significant variables. 
Unfortunately, our dataset does not contain information about the income of applicants, 
only credit ratios. Because the variables do not have discriminatory power, both can serve 
only as an initial cut-off criterion to exclude clients whose credibility is very low. Also, 
variables connected with credit risk mitigation (i.e. the number of co-signers or collateral) 
were not selected for the final model by the test. This result is unexpected because the 
existence of collateral is usually a very strong motivation to repay debts. We can only 
speculate that one of the reasons is that the dataset contains observations of smaller loans 
                                                 
24 The recent trend in the Czech Republic is an outflow of city dwellers with higher incomes to new houses 
built in the suburbs. The decision to renovate older houses is mostly made by people living in the 
countryside, who tend to have lower incomes. 
  17(up to 1.5 million CZK), and in the case of default, the bank tries to recover its losses 
from co-signers rather than by selling collateral. 
Our assessment shows that logistic regression can be very successful in creating a 
powerful model for credit scoring and it is able to capture various features specific to 
emerging market economies. It is also able to detect the variables with the most 
discriminating power and combine them so that the bank can detect default behavior in 
multiple ways that are also partially exclusive. 
 
3. 2 CART analysis 
In this section we provide another analysis of the default behavior of retail clients, using 
Classification and Regression Trees (CART). The theory behind CART analysis and 
some of its applications as a discrimination tool, or pattern recognition technique, can be 
found in Breiman et al. (1984) or Webb (2002). The literature describes many uses of 
trees in the area of credit scoring.
25 Further, the method has been shown to be very 
competitive with parametric tools such as logistic regression.
26 Finally, the advantage of 
CART in credit scoring is that it is very intuitive, easy to explain to management, and 
able to deal with missing observations. 
The CART tree is a non-parametric approach and consists of several layers of 
nodes: the first layer consists of a root node and the last layer consists of leaf nodes. 
Because it is a binary tree, each node (except the leaf nodes) is connected to two nodes in 
the next layer. The root node contains the entire training set; the other nodes contain 
subsets of the training set. At each node, the subset is divided into two disjoint groups, 
based on one specific characteristic xi from the measurement vector. The split into two 
groups is defined by the following inequality: if xi is an ordinal variable, then the split 
occurs when xi > t; for some constant threshold t. It follows that an individual j is 
classified into the right node if the previous statement is true; if not, the individual j is 
classified into the left node. A similar rule applies when xi is a categorized variable. 
                                                 
25 As an example, Chandy and Duett (1990) compared CART with logit and LDA and found that these 
methods are comparable in results to a sample of commercial papers from Moody's and S&P. 
26 See Feldman and Gross (2005), Yeh et al. (2007) or Lee et al. (2006). We acknowledge the fact that 
CART methodology might be less stable with respect to changes in data than logistic regression (see for 
example Hastie et al., 2001). However, in our case we obtained very similar results from both types of 
techniques. 
  18The characteristic xi is chosen from all possible characteristics and the constant t 
is chosen such that the resulting sub-samples are as homogeneous in the dependent 
variable y as possible. In other words, xi and t are chosen to minimize the diversity of the 
resulting sub-samples (diversity in this context will be defined presently). The 
classification process is a recursive procedure that starts at the root node and at each 
further node (with the exception of leaf nodes) one single characteristic and a splitting 
rule (or constant t) are selected. First, the best split is found for each characteristic. Then, 
among these characteristics the one with the best split is chosen. This procedure is 
replicated until the resulting samples are not homogenous enough. As the trees often 
become quite large, one needs to simplify them. The procedures that prune the existing 
trees aim to equalize the classification error in the pruned tree to that in the original tree. 
Following the above general description of the algorithm we present in Figure 3 
the optimal tree obtained after the pruning procedure. The tree was constructed by using 
the short list of variables as in the previous subsection, however without the need to 
create categories for the numeric variables. In each node we present the variable, 
classification rule, and the value of characteristic x based on which the decision is made. 
We also describe the classification of finite nodes in the text below. All clients that 
satisfy the classification rule are assigned to the left child-subtree. This means that in the 
node 1 all observations where Own Resources x<0.385 are assigned to the left child-
subtree and all observations where Own Resources>0.385 are assigned to the right child-
subtree. For the finite nodes the classification is “default” or “non-default”, based on the 
actual ratio of default observations in these nodes. Further, in the left child-subtree, the 
tree branches at node 2 (Elementary Education or Secondary Vocational Education) with 
respect to the characteristic x value for Own Resources (node 4). In the case when Own 
Resources x<0.345, both finite nodes are classified as default. There are 714 observations 
in the left node with 90.9% successful classification and 244 observations in the right 
node with 72.95% successful classification. In the case when Own Resources x<0.025, 
the left finite node is classified as default and there are 96 observations with 97.92% 
successful classification. Node 4 branches to node 5 (Length of Relationship smaller or 
equal to 1 or N/A) from which the right finite node is classified as non-default, having 
123 observations with 75.61% successful classification. The left branch from node 5 goes 
  19to node 6 (Purpose of Loan: Purchase of Land or Renovation). From node 5 the left finite 
node is classified as default, having 336 observations with 73.81% successful 
classification, and the right finite node is classified as non-default, having 144 
observations with 55.56% successful classification. 
Finally, in the right child-subtree, the tree branches at node 7 (Length of 
Relationship smaller or equal to 1 or N/A) to nodes 8 and 12. At node 12 for Amount of 
Loan x<111.500 both finite nodes are classified as non-default; 302 observations in the 
left node with 76.82% successful classification and 456 observations in the right node 
with 89.04% successful classification. At node 8 (Elementary Education or Secondary 
Vocational Education) the tree branches to the right with respect to the characteristic x 
value for Purpose of Loan: Purchase of Land, Purchase of House or Renovation (node 
11). Here both finite nodes are classified as non-default; 298 observations in the left node 
with 70.13% successful classification, 220 observations in the right node with 85.91% 
successful classification. Node 8 then branches to the left with respect to the 
characteristic x value for Own Resources (node 9). For the value of Own Resources 
x<0.755 the right finite node is classified as default, having 12 observations with 91.67% 
successful classification. To the left node 9 branches to node 10 (Own Resources) where 
for the value of Own Resources x<0.525 both finite nodes are classified as non-default: 
the left node has 274 observations with 54.01% successful classification and there are 
184 observations in the right node with 70.11% successful classification. 
In order to further assess the results of the CART methodology we inspect the 
plots of the ROC (yielding the c coefficients) in Figures 1 and 2, introduced earlier in 
Section 3.1. The ROC plots are of comparable qualities, as are the associated derived c 
coefficients. The c coefficient for the development sample (Figure 1) amounts to c=0.830 
and for the validation sample (Figure 2), it is c=0.815. These results, combined with the 
comparison of the CART and logistic regression ROC plots in both figures, serve as 
evidence that CART methodology can also be very successful in discriminating between 
default and non-default behavior. Thus, it can be used successfully for credit scoring 
decisions. Another very useful feature of CART is the possibility of its use for sensitivity 
analysis with respect to different variables. In this respect Own Resources, Education, 
Length of the Relationship, Purpose of Loan and Amount of Loan were identified as the 
  20most important variables. These variables play a role at the top nodes and they are 
identical to those identified by parametric regression. Thus, CART confirmed the 
variable selection of the logistic regression in the previous subsection. 
According to the tree, strong default behavior is connected with the client owning 
a small amount of resources and having a low level of education. Non-default behavior is 
linked with the client owning a high amount of resources and having a long-standing 
relationship with the bank. Both of these predictions are in accord with the selection by 
logistic regression in the previous subsection. 
Finally, we also estimated a tree analogical to Model 3, i.e. the tree without the 
most significant variable of the Own Resources. The power of this specification is lower 
than that of all models we were able to estimate. The value of the c coefficient is c=0.804, 
meaning that the value of the associated GINI coefficient is GINI=0.608. It seems that for 
the non-parametric approach it is important to include the most significant variables. The 
reason is due to the CART methodology design: in the highest nodes the largest increase 
in the efficiency of CART occurs when using these very significant variables. Despite the 




In this paper we developed an optimal (in the sense of achieving the highest 
discriminatory power) specification of the credit scoring model. We employed two 
approaches: parametric (logistic regression) and non-parametric (Classification and 
Regression Trees, or CART). Along with analyzing our results we also aimed to assess 
the determinants of default behavior. Our dataset is rich in socio-demographic and 
behavioral variables. These variables provide more stable information about client 
characteristics in times of economic change or financial instability than standard financial 
variables. 
We construct three different models using logistic regression and one model using 
CART and compare these models in terms of efficiency and power in discriminating 
between bad and good clients, including out-of-sample testing. We were able to detect 
the most important financial and behavioral characteristics of default behavior: the 
  21amount of resources a client owns, the level of education, marital status, the purpose of 
the loan, and the years of having an account with the bank. One of our strategic 
contributions is that in terms of a logistic regression model we identified a specification 
that does not contain the single most important financial variable (the amount of 
resources a client owns) but still performs only marginally worse than the specification 
with this variable. Further, both methods validated similar variables as determinants, 
which means that both methods are robust and can be used for the delicate task of 
constructing a credit scoring model interchangeably or complementarily. This is another 
main contribution of our paper since in practice parametric methods (mostly logistic 
regression) are used for model construction almost exclusively. This study shows that 
non-parametric methods can also be successful and are able to create good models. In this 
respect our analysis is relevant from various perspectives. 
This paper contributes to the growing literature on pattern recognition techniques 
and their use in various fields of economy and finance. We deal with the application 
scoring model, i.e. we focus only on client characteristics at the time of loan application. 
This paper shows that socio-demographic variables do have a role in the process of the 
granting of credit and therefore they should not be excluded from credit scoring model 
specification. An interesting task would be to assess the efficiency of models based solely 
on behavioral characteristics (the behavior of the client on his or her current account, the 
behavior of the client on loans already granted, etc.). Application characteristics are 
usually not updated during the life of the loan and they grow more imprecise as time 
elapses. For risk management purposes, such as early warning systems, or managing the 
current portfolio of loans in general, behavioral models are therefore better. This is left 
for further research. 
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Sex  c  Sex of the client, categorized variable 
Marital status  c  Status of the client, single/married, categorized variable 
Date of Birth    Date of birth of client 
Sector of employment  c  The sector in which the client is employed, categorized variable 
Type of employment  c  Type of client’s employment, categorized variable 
Education  c  The highest attained education of client, categorized variable 
Number of employments    The total number of employments in the last 3 years 
Employment position  c  The position of client in employment, categorized variable 
Years of employment    The number of years in the current employment 
Credit ratio 1    Ratio of Expenditures/Income of client 
Credit ratio 2    Ratio of (Income-Expenditure)/Living Wage of client 
Region    Post Code of region of client’s address 
 
Bank-client relationship variables 
 
Type of product    Type of product/loan 
Number of co-signers    The Number of co-signers for the current loan 
Purpose of loan  c  The declared purpose of loan, categorized variable 
Loan Assurance  c  The type of credit risk mitigation, categorized variable 
Points    The characteristics of client’s behavior at the current account 
Own resources    Declared own resources, in percentage of total amount needed 
Amount of loan    The total amount of loan granted 
Date of account opening    The year when client opened an account in the bank 
Date of loan    The year in which the loan was granted 
Length of the 
Relationship    The length of client/bank relationship at the time of loan 
application 
Note : “c” denotes categorized variables. 
 Table 2: Information values for variables 
Own Resources  1.462601 
Date of account opening  0.631346 
Length of the Relationship  0.601787 
Points  0.502122 
Education  0.359725 
Purpose of loan  0.279959 
Years of employment  0.136041 
Sector of employment  0.188681 
Credit ratio 1  0.175810 
Number of co-signers  0.131135 
Amount of loan  0.123972 
Marital status  0.112809 
Region  0.093896 
Employment position  0.063872 
Type of employment  0.055486 
Credit ratio 2  0.052161 
Date of Birth  0.047698 
Sex  0.039528 
Loan Assurance  0.036422 
Type of product  0.022380 
Number of employments  0.021004  
Table 3: Coefficients for the Model 1. 
AIC= 2119.02 
   Value Coefficient  Std.  Error  t  value 
Intercept     3.78371 0.64390  5.87621 
Own resources  0.00+ thru 0.05  reference value       
   0.05+ thru 0.33  -1.54237  0.32630  -4.72682 
    0.33+ thru 0.36  -2.29475  0.33569  -6.83584 
   0.36+ thru 0.39  -2.87026  0.35403  -8.10729 
   0.39+ thru 0.50  -4.02564  0.35085  -11.47404 
   0.50+ thru 1.52  -4.64785  0.36855  -12.61131 
Education  Elementary  reference value       
   Vocational Education  0.13811  0.26275  0.52564 
   Vocational Education with Leaving Exam  -1.27385  0.30249  -4.21123 
   Secondary Education  -0.55807  0.27739  -2.01186 
   Higher Secondary Education  -1.17440  0.73141  -1.60567 
   University Education  -1.44495  0.35028  -4.12518 
Length of the Relationship  N/A  reference value       
   0  0.67445 0.30510  2.21062 
   0.00+ thru   1  0.32457  0.30735  1.05602 
   1.00+ thru   3  -1.09010  0.27888  -3.90892 
   3.00+ thru   5  -1.63525  0.26518  -6.16647 
   5.00+ thru  10  -1.68684  0.31572  -5.34283 
Date of account opening  1993-1995  reference value       
   1996-1997  0.21179  0.25756  0.82228 
   1998-1999  -0.17575  0.29988  -0.58609 
   2000  -0.45583  0.37718  -1.20851 
   2001  -1.23762  0.40064  -3.08911 
   2002-2004  -1.84824  0.43655  -4.23372 
Purpose of loan  Building of House  reference value       
   Purchase of Apartment  0.57782  0.36337  1.59015 
   Purchase of Land  0.68067  0.66512  1.02338 
   Purchase of House  0.51811  0.38151  1.35805 
   Renovation  0.99526  0.34190  2.91095 
   Rest  0.07332  0.37016  0.19807 
   N/A  0.27270  0.41299  0.66031 Marital Status  Married  reference value       
   Single  0.45971  0.11689  3.93290 
Years of employment  0+ thru  4  reference value       
   4+ thru  5  0.31437  0.20178  1.55793 
   5+ thru  6  -0.07598  0.23656  -0.32121 
   6+ thru  9  -0.06273  0.16260  -0.38577 
   9+ thru 14  -0.18129  0.17992  -1.00761 
   14+ thru 60  -0.90223  0.22746  -3.96659 
Sector of employment  Building Industry  reference value       
   Mining  0.75255  0.57887  1.30003 
   Education  -0.68439  0.41070  -1.66641 
   Energy- and Water-supply  -0.40454  0.49881  -0.81101 
   Financial Services  -1.08128  0.57359  -1.88510 
   Gastronomy and Lodging  0.23238  0.35022  0.66353 
   Health Service  -0.14517  0.36312  -0.39980 
   Trade  0.08452  0.23730  0.35619 
   Agriculture und Forestry  0.07997  0.41040  0.19485 
   Communications  -0.28384  0.28931  -0.98108 
   N/A  -0.69468  0.36965  -1.87931 
   Other Business  0.34166  0.24870  1.37379 
   Public Services  -0.32983  0.23067  -1.42986 
Points  0.0+ thru    1.0  reference value       
   1.0+ thru   28.0  -0.51537  0.20319  -2.53635 
    28.0+ thru  363.0  -0.18748  0.14919  -1.25669 
   363.0+ thru 1401.0  0.01587  0.19400  0.08179 
Amount of loan  2489+ thru   50000  reference value       
     50000+ thru   69000  0.19988  0.27334  0.73125 
     69000+ thru   100000  0.08803  0.19806  0.44446 
    100000+ thru  200000    -0.40900  0.20303  -2.01446 
    200000+ thru  250000    -0.22937  0.24109  -0.95137 
    250000+ thru  1500000    -0.08822  0.21776  -0.40512 
 
Note: AIC= 2119.02 Table 4: Coefficients for the Model 2 
 
   Value Coefficient  Std.  Error  t  value 
Intercept     4.56228 0.51011  8.94381 
Own resources  0.00+ thru 0.05  reference value       
   0.05+ thru 0.33  -1.51356  0.31954  -4.73668 
    0.33+ thru 0.36  -2.30000  0.32865  -6.99829 
   0.36+ thru 0.39  -2.93355  0.34589  -8.48109 
   0.39+ thru 0.50  -4.19918  0.34411  -12.20293 
   0.50+ thru 1.52  -4.85161  0.36079  -13.44702 
Education  Elementary  reference value       
   Vocational Education  0.04582  0.24896  0.18404 
   Vocational Education with Leaving Exam  -1.34695  0.28521  -4.72262 
   Secondary education  -0.80089  0.25739  -3.11154 
   Higher Secondary Education  -1.58778  0.70190  -2.26213 
   University Education  -1.76433  0.32876  -5.36660 
Length of the Relationship  N/A  reference value       
   0  0.84966 0.29498  2.88041 
   0.00+ thru   1  0.42240  0.29531  1.43036 
   1.00+ thru   3  -0.91298  0.26804  -3.40609 
   3.00+ thru   5  -1.55988  0.25746  -6.05862 
   5.00+ thru  10  -1.63651  0.30610  -5.34632 
Date of account opening  1993-1995  reference value       
   1996-1997  0.10116  0.24997  0.40468 
   1998-1999  -0.31016  0.29192  -1.06248 
   2000  -0.62740  0.36594  -1.71450 
   2001  -1.43871  0.38669  -3.72053 
   2002-2004  -2.00568  0.42097  -4.76445 
Marital Status  Married  reference value       
   Single  0.43446  0.11185  3.88427 
Amount of loan  2489+ thru   50000  reference value       
     50000+ thru   69000  0.30255  0.26348  1.14829 
     69000+ thru   100000  0.23203  0.19109  1.21423 
    100000+ thru  200000    -0.38896  0.19412  -2.00365 
    200000+ thru  250000    -0.27958  0.22967  -1.21730 
    250000+ thru  1500000    -0.09691  0.20469  -0.47345 Points  0.0+ thru    1.0  reference value       
   1.0+ thru   28.0  -0.51402  0.19763  -2.60091 
    28.0+ thru  363.0  -0.25143  0.14331  -1.75441 
   363.0+ thru 1401.0  -0.02252  0.18889  -0.11922 
 
Note: AIC= 2164.82 Table 5: Coefficients for the Model 3 
 
   Value Coefficient  Std.  Error  t  value 
Intercept     -0.59168 0.47774  -1.23850 
Date of account opening  1993-1995  reference value       
   1996-1997  0.55709 0.23483  2.37227 
   1998-1999  0.66359 0.26747  2.48099 
   2000  0.71870 0.33520  2.14411 
   2001  0.55238 0.34562  1.59821 
   2002-2004  1.14773 0.35307  3.25069 
Education  Elementary  reference value       
   Vocational Education  0.07169  0.23390  0.30648 
   Vocational Education with Leaving Exam  -1.40647  0.26712  -5.26538 
   Secondary education  -0.85965  0.24180  -3.55521 
   Higher Secondary Education  -1.47476  0.69827  -2.11202 
   University Education  -1.64829  0.30919  -5.33104 
Purpose of loan  Building of House  reference value       
   Purchase of Apartment  0.84813  0.34856  2.43326 
   Purchase of Land  0.81182  0.56542  1.43578 
   Purchase of House  0.81916  0.36438  2.24807 
   Renovation  1.54520 0.32986  4.68444 
   Rest  0.35889 0.35419  1.01327 
   N/A  0.40644 0.39853  1.01987 
Points  0.0+ thru    1.0  reference value       
   1.0+ thru   28.0  -0.71267  0.17700  -4.02641 
    28.0+ thru  363.0  -0.82731  0.13231  -6.25299 
   363.0+ thru 1401.0  -0.87127  0.16936  -5.14450 
Marital Status  Married  reference value       
   Single  0.50590 0.10608  4.76919 
Length of the Relationship  N/A  reference value       
   0  -0.29791 0.26704  -1.11563 
   0.00+ thru   1  -0.29920  0.27439  -1.09040 
   1.00+ thru   3  -1.08482  0.24593  -4.41101 
   3.00+ thru   5  -1.34039  0.24019  -5.58059 
   5.00+ thru  10  -0.76584  0.26993  -2.83722 
Years of employment  0+ thru  4  reference value          4+ thru  5  0.25759 0.18265  1.41030 
   5+ thru  6  0.02235 0.21297  0.10496 
   6+ thru  9  -0.12660 0.14386  -0.88003 
   9+ thru 14  -0.26489 0.16047  -1.65074 
   14+ thru 60  -0.89137 0.19813  -4.49898 
Amount of loan  2489+ thru   50000  reference value       
     50000+ thru   69000  0.03081  0.24944  0.12351 
     69000+ thru   100000  -0.01095  0.17532  -0.06245 
    100000+ thru  200000    -0.08396  0.17787  -0.47203 
    200000+ thru  250000    0.48678  0.20739  2.34718 
    250000+ thru  1500000    0.54034  0.18367  2.94193 
 
Note: AIC = 2430.41 Table 6: Stability of the models 
      Development   Validation  
Model 1  c 0.877  0.869 
   GINI  0.754  0.738 
         
Model 2  c 0.864  0.855 
   GINI  0.728  0.71 
         
Model 3  c 0.832  0.814 
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Table A1: Information values of variables 
SEX                      
   bad  good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
M  1069  910  1979 0.630678 0.532787 1.183735  0.0165118 
F  626  798  1424 0.369322 0.467213 0.790478  0.0230161 
  Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1      0.0395279 
         
Marital Status                   
   bad  good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
Single  813  540  1353 0.479646 0.316159 1.517103  0.0681417 
Married  882  1168  2050 0.520354 0.683841 0.760929  0.0446672 
  Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  2.278031  0.1128088 
         
Type of product                   
   bad  good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
1  1588  1538  3126 0.936873 0.900468 1.040429  0.0014428 
2  102  152  254 0.060177 0.088993 0.676199  0.0112748 
3 and more  5  18  23  0.00295  0.010539  0.279908  0.0096628 
  Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  1.996536  0.0223803 
         
Number of co-signers                   
   bad good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
1  789  499  1288 0.465487 0.292155 1.593289  0.0807382 
2  881  1168  2049 0.519764 0.683841 0.760066  0.0450145 
3  20  36  56 0.011799 0.021077 0.559816  0.0053825 4  5  5  10 0.00295  0.002927 1.00767  1.72E-07 
  Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  3.920841  0.1311354 
         
Sector of employment                   
   bad  good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
Building  Industry  153  118  271 0.090265 0.069087 1.306555  0.0056631 
Mining  29  9  38 0.017109 0.005269 3.246935  0.0139439 
Education  26  78  104 0.015339 0.045667  0.33589  0.0330872 
Energy- and Water-
supply  15 31 46  0.00885  0.01815  0.487582  0.0066804 
Financial  Services  12 34 46  0.00708  0.019906  0.355648  0.0132604 
Gastronomy  and  Lodging  91  48  139 0.053687 0.028103 1.910374  0.0165607 
Health  Service  48  83  131 0.028319 0.048595 0.582749  0.0109492 
Trade  360 292 652  0.212389  0.17096  1.242332  0.0089897 
Agriculture  und  Forestry  56  33  89 0.033038 0.019321 1.709985  0.0073592 
Communications  124  136  260 0.073156 0.079625 0.918758  0.0005481 
N/A  41  74  115 0.024189 0.043326 0.558303  0.0111539 
Other  Business  320  200  520 0.188791 0.117096 1.612271  0.0342445 
Public  Services  420  572  992 0.247788 0.334895 0.739897  0.0262405 
  Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  15.00728  0.1886808 
         
Purpose of loan                   
   bad  good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
Building of House   21  99  120  0.012389  0.057963  0.213748  0.0703174 
Purchase  of  Apartment  191  279  470 0.112684 0.163349 0.689838  0.0188117 
Purchase of Land  12  26  38  0.00708  0.015222  0.465078  0.0062337 
Purchase of House  115  146  261  0.067847  0.08548  0.793712  0.0040739 
Renovation  1164  773  1937 0.686726 0.452576 1.517371  0.0976354 
Rest  145  259  404 0.085546 0.151639 0.564139  0.0378356 
N/A  47 126 173  0.027729  0.07377  0.375877  0.0450517   Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  4.619764  0.2799594 
         
Type of employment                   
   bad good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
Unemployed  12  6  18  0.00708 0.003513 2.015339  0.0024995 
White  Collar  50  88  138 0.029499 0.051522  0.57254  0.012282 
Manual  Worker  1292  1202  2494 0.762242 0.703747 1.083119  0.0046705 
Maternity  Leave  55  95  150 0.032448 0.055621 0.583388  0.0124876 
Retired  108  117  225 0.063717 0.068501 0.930157  0.0003464 
Rest  3 13 16  0.00177  0.007611  0.232539  0.0085207 
Student  6 24 30  0.00354  0.014052  0.251917  0.014492 
Entrepreneur  169  163  332 0.099705 0.095433 1.044762  0.0001871 
  Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  6.71376  0.0554859 
         
Education                      
   bad  good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
Elementary  126  55  181 0.074336 0.032201 2.308479  0.0352496 
Vocational  Education  957  591  1548 0.564602 0.346019 1.631709  0.1070243 
Vocational Education with 
Leaving  Exam  124  285  409 0.073156 0.166862 0.438425  0.0772665 
Secondary  Education  427 554 981  0.251917  0.324356  0.77667  0.0183081 
Higher Secondary 
Education  7 26 33  0.00413  0.015222  0.271296  0.0144709 
University  Education  54 197 251  0.031858  0.11534  0.276214  0.1074051 
  Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  5.702792  0.3597246 
         
Number of 
employments                   
   bad good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
1  1577  1644  3221 0.930383 0.962529 0.966603  0.0010919 
More  than  1  118  64  182 0.069617 0.037471 1.857891  0.0199125   Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  2.824494  0.0210044 
         
Loan Assurance                   
   bad good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
Guarantor  1249  1119  2368 0.736873 0.655152 1.124736  0.0096061 
Real  Estate  173  260  433 0.102065 0.152225 0.670488  0.0200514 
Rest  5 10 15  0.00295  0.005855  0.503835  0.0019914 
NA  268  319  587 0.158112 0.186768 0.846569  0.0047731 
  Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  3.145627 0.036422 
         
Employment position                   
   bad  good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
Employee  1292  1241  2533 0.762242 0.726581 1.049081  0.0017087 
Self-employed  153  136  289 0.090265 0.079625 1.133628  0.0013345 
Freelancer  1 24 25  0.00059  0.014052  0.041986  0.0426787 
Higher  Management  25  18  43 0.014749 0.010539 1.399541  0.0014154 
Lower  Management  54  44  98 0.031858 0.025761 1.236685  0.0012953 
Other  170  245  415 0.100295 0.143443 0.699199  0.0154391 
Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  5.560121  0.0638716 
         
Points          
  bad good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
0.0+ thru    1.0  978  442  1420  0.5769912  0.2587822  2.22964  0.255000 
1.0+ thru   28.0  166  163  329  0.0979351  0.0954333  1.0262157  0.000065 
 28.0+ thru  363.0  367  609  976  0.2165192  0.3565574  0.6072492  0.0698533 
363.0+  thru  1401.0  184  494  678 0.1085546 0.2892272 0.3753263  0.1770518 
Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  4.2384312  0.5021226 
         
Years of employment                      bad good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
0+ thru  4  743  536  1279  0.4383481  0.3138173  1.3968256  0.0416185 
4+ thru  5  197  140  337  0.1162242  0.0819672  1.4179351  0.0119626 
5+ thru  6  128  120  248  0.0755162  0.0702576  1.0748476  0.0003796 
6+ thru  9  320  373  693  0.1887906  0.2183841  0.8644887  0.0043093 
9+ thru 14  205  331  536  0.120944  0.1937939  0.6240854  0.0343464 
14+ thru 60  102  208  310  0.060177  0.1217799  0.4941457  0.0434254 
  Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  5.8723281  0.1360418 
         
Own resources                   
   bad good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
0.00+ thru 0.05  323  22  345  0.19056  0.012881  14.79442  0.4787141 
0.05+  thru  0.33  548  143  691 0.3233038 0.0837237 3.8615591  0.3236898 
 0.33+ thru 0.36  276  144  420  0.162832  0.084309  1.931367  0.0516859 
0.36+  thru  0.39  154  140  294 0.090855 0.081967 1.108437  0.000915 
0.39+  thru  0.50  197  487  684 0.1162242 0.2851288 0.4076199  0.1515784 
0.50+  thru  1.52  197  772  969 0.1162242 0.4519906 0.2571385  0.4560180 
Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  22.360542  1.4626013 
         
Credit Ratio 1                   
   bad good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
0.000+  thru    3.102  104  237  341 0.061357 0.138759 0.442184  0.0631621 
3.102+  thru    5.134  145  195  340 0.085546 0.114169 0.749293  0.0082613 
5.134+  thru    7.400  138  203  341 0.081416 0.118852 0.685017  0.0141627 
7.400+  thru    9.510  146  194  340 0.086136 0.113583 0.758349  0.0075923 
9.510+  thru  11.660  167  174  341 0.098525 0.101874 0.967131  0.0001119 
11.660+  thru  14.342  176  163  339 0.103835 0.095433 1.088036  0.0007089 
14.342+  thru  17.274  186  154  340 0.109735 0.090164 1.217056  0.0038443 
17.274+  thru  21.310  204  138  342 0.120354 0.080796 1.489599  0.015764 21.310+  thru  28.200  225  114  339 0.132743 0.066745 1.988822  0.0453769 
28.200+  thru  95.610  204  136  340 0.120354 0.079625 1.511504  0.0168252 
Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  10.89699  0.1758096 
         
Credit Ratio 2                   
   bad  good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
-1.010+ thru  1.240  163  184  347  0.096165  0.107728  0.892664  0.00131294 
1.240+ thru  1.424:  0    180  154  334  0.106195  0.090164  1.177796  0.002623347 
  1.424+ thru  1.580:  0    193  171  364  0.113864  0.100117  1.137311  0.001768812 
  1.580+ thru  1.730:  0    155  162  317  0.091445  0.094848  0.964128  0.000124291 
  1.730+ thru  1.900:  0    198  157  355  0.116814  0.09192  1.270819  0.005966084 
  1.900+ thru  2.120:  0    190  151  341  0.112094  0.088407  1.267929  0.005622905 
  2.120+ thru  2.400:  0    176  159  335  0.103835  0.093091  1.115408  0.001173404 
  2.400+ thru  2.760:  0    170  160  330  0.100295  0.093677  1.070649  0.000451789 
  2.760+ thru  3.460:  0    137  208  345  0.080826  0.12178  0.663705  0.016787692 
  3.460+ thru 47.010:335   133  202  335  0.078466  0.118267  0.663466  0.016329443 
Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  10.22387  0.052160706 
         
Amount of loan                   
   bad good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
2489+ thru   50000  237  251  488  0.139823  0.146956  0.951465  0.0003549 
  50000+ thru   69000  82  122  204  0.048378  0.071429  0.677286  0.008982 
  69000+ thru   100000  335  378  713  #DIV/0!  #DIV/0!  0.9514617  0.0026778 
 100000+ thru  200000    300  468  768  #DIV/0!  #DIV/0!  0.6772879  0.0423993 
 200000+ thru  250000    236  185  421  0.139233  0.108314  1.28546  0.0077642 
 250000+ thru  1500000    505  304  809  #DIV/0!  #DIV/0!  #DIV/0!  0.0617943 
Total  1695 1708 3403  1.0000004  1  6.1271185  0.1239726 
         
Date of account opening                   bad  good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
1993-1995  96  373  469 0.056637 0.218384 0.259347  0.218292 
1996-1997  121 292 413  0.071386  0.17096  0.417562 0.08696 
1998-1999  261 344 605  0.1539823  0.2014052  0.76454  0.0127321 
2000  156  179  335 0.092035 0.104801 0.878193  0.0016581 
2001  277 239 516  0.163422  0.13993  1.167885  0.0036458 
2002-2004  784  281  1065 0.4625369 0.1645199 2.8114341  0.3080586 
Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  6.2989611  0.6313467 
         
         
Date of Birth                   
   bad good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
1913+ thru 1948:  0    138  223  361  0.081416  0.130562  0.62358  0.023210624 
 1948+ thru 1953:  0    160  191  351  0.094395  0.111827  0.844121  0.002953915 
 1953+ thru 1957:  0    159  153  312  0.093805  0.089578  1.047186  0.000194886 
 1957+ thru 1962:  0    195  161  356  0.115044  0.094262  1.220469  0.004140504 
 1962+ thru 1966:  0    222  195  417  0.130973  0.114169  1.147193  0.002307609 
 1966+ thru 1969:  0    163  159  322  0.096165  0.093091  1.03302  9.98584E-05 
 1969+ thru 1972:  0    184  178  362  0.108555  0.104215  1.041636  0.000177004 
 1972+ thru 1974:  0    132  161  293  0.077876  0.094262  0.826164  0.003129141 
 1974+ thru 1977:  0    175  171  346  0.103245  0.100117  1.031241  9.6218E-05 
 1977+ thru 2001  167  116  283  0.098525  0.067916  1.450697  0.011388037 
Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  10.26531  0.047697795 
         
Date of Loan                   
   bad good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
NA  194  215  409 0.114454 0.125878 0.909246 0.001086868 
1999  94  184  278 0.055457 0.107728 0.514788  0.03470805 
2000  138  248  386 0.081416 0.145199 0.560719 0.036900757 2001  295  362  657 0.174041 0.211944 0.821167 0.007467872 
2002  708  476  1184 0.417699 0.278689 1.498803 0.056252942 
2003  256  210  466 0.151032 0.122951 1.228397 0.005776679 
2004  10 13 23  0.0059  0.007611  0.77513  0.000435969 
Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  6.308251  0.142629137 
         
         
Region                      
   bad good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
<19999  86  109  195 0.050737 0.063817 0.795042 0.003000001 
20000-29999  133  178  311 0.078466 0.104215 0.752922 0.007307521 
30000-39999  204  291  495 0.120354 0.170375 0.706408 0.017385349 
40000-49999  362  203  565 0.213569 0.118852 1.796928 0.055511525 
50000-59999  218  186  404 0.128614 0.108899 1.181032 0.003280233 
60000-69999  226  202  428 0.133333 0.118267 1.127393 0.001806571 
70000-  466  539  1005 0.274926 0.315574 0.871195 0.005604869 
Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  7.230919  0.09389607 
         
         
Length of the Relationship                   
   bad good  total  %bad  %good  odds 
information 
value 
N/A  194  215  409 0.1144543 0.1258782 0.9092461  0.0010869 
0  1034  536  1570 0.6100295 0.3138173  1.9439  0.1968911 
0.00+ thru   1  238  188  426  0.140413  0.1100703  1.2756669  0.0073875 
1.00+ thru   3  98  245  343  0.0578171  0.1434426  0.4030678  0.0778037 
3.00+ thru   5  68  300  368  0.040118  0.175644  0.2284051  0.2001224 
5.00+ thru  10  63  224  287  0.0371681  0.1311475  0.2834071  0.1184959 
Total  1695 1708 3403  1  1  5.0436929  0.6017875 
 Table A2: Coefficient for the model with the continuous variables 
   Value Coefficient  Std.  Error  t  value 
Intercept     1.20131 0.51311  2.34126 
Own resources     -5.42117 0.44089  -12.29606 
Education  Basic  reference value       
   Vocational Education  0.13671  0.24435  0.55948 
   Vocational Education with Matura  -1.15895  0.28132  -4.11965 
   Secondary education  -0.51957  0.25610  -2.02883 
   Higher Secondary Education  -0.96695  0.71644  -1.34966 
   University degree  -1.42234  0.32572  -4.36670 
Purpose of loan  Building of House  reference value       
   Purchase of Flat  0.64425  0.34738  1.85458 
   Purchase of Land  0.50460  0.59804  0.84376 
   Purchase of House  0.70929  0.36566  1.93974 
   Renovation  1.22459  0.32710  3.74378 
   Rest  0.18836 0.35569  0.52957 
   N/A  0.31253 0.39913  0.78302 
Date of account opening-1992     0.14769 0.02363  6.25118 
Marital Status  Married  reference value      
   Single  -0.52660 0.10782  -4.88407 
Length of relationship     -0.00045 0.00009  -4.87918 
Sector of employment  Building Industry  reference value       
   Mining  0.47193 0.53352  0.88455 
   Education  -0.88736  0.38839  -2.28469 
   Energy- and Water-supply  -0.48227  0.47076  -1.02445 
   Financial Services  -0.93850  0.51657  -1.81678 
   Gastronomy and Lodging  0.25019  0.31781  0.78722 
   Health Service  -0.38981  0.33693  -1.15693 
   Trade  0.04430 0.21546  0.20562 
   Agriculture und Forestry  -0.12222  0.39128  -0.31236 
   Communications  -0.39306  0.26585  -1.47851    N/A  -0.62386 0.33999  -1.83490 
   Other Business  0.25864  0.22646  1.14212 
   Public Services  -0.57888  0.20831  -2.77892 
Years of employment     -0.03413 0.00857  -3.98374 
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